ELFT HÍRADÓ

[Laszlo E Szabo <leszabo AT hps.elte.hu>]

Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM
(http://hps.elte.hu/seminar)
________________________________________________

April program

 8 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54

 Panel discussion:
  A Godel-tetel filozofiai kovetkezmenyei
  Philosophical upshot of Godel's theorem

 Panelists:
Ferenc Csaba (Logic, Eotvos)
Janos Geier (Psychology, Eotvos)
Andras Mate (Logic, Eotvos)
Istvan Nemeti (Renyi Institute of Mathematics)

 Moderator:
Laszlo E. Szabo (Theoretical Physics & HPS, Eotvos)

Iden unnepeljuk Bolyai Janos szuletesenek ketszazadik evfordulojat!
Bolyai, Gauss es Lobacsevszkij az elso nem-euklideszi geometriak
megalkotasaval inditottak el azt a folyamatot, amit a matematika
ontudatra ebredesenek nevezhetnenk. A matematika eme onreflexiojaval
a filozofia epitmenyenek masik tartopillere, a racionalizmus
is meginogni latszik. (Az elso, az empirizmus ugyanis mar
Hume ota aladucolasra szorul.) A 19. szazad vegere vilagos
volt, hogy ujra kell gondolnunk a matematika alapveto mibenletet.
Ugy tunik, a matematika -- ahogyan Russell megfogalmazta -- "olyan
tudomany, amelyben nem tudjuk mirol beszelunk, vagy hogy
igaz-e, amit mondunk". A matematikus szamara sem az axiomaknak, sem a beloluk 
levezetett allitasoknak nincs jelentese, es nincs igazsaga. A matematikus 
dolga a levezetes maga. Sokaig ugy tunt, hogy a Hilbert-fele 
formalista/axiomatikus program a dolgokat a helyere teszi, mignem 1931-ben egy
fiatal Becsi matematikus, Kurt Godel kozzetette az "Uber
formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und
verwandter Systeme" cimu dolgozatat. Altalanos
velekedes szerint, Godel eredmenyei lehetetlenne tettek
a formalista program folytatasat.

Tenyleg igy van-e? Hol tartunk most? Hogyan is kell pontosan
ertekelnunk Godel teteleit? Ezekket a kerdeseket fogjuk
megvitatni.

 15 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54

 Evolutionary Moral Realism

 John Collier
  Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research,
  Altenberg, Austria

Moral realism is the view that moral kinds, such as values,
obligations, rights, duties and the like, are objective
kinds that ground moral "oughts". Moral naturalism is the
view that moral kinds can best be explained in naturalistic
terms. The evolutionary version of moral naturalism holds
that evolutionary explanations are central to satisfactory
naturalistic explanations of morality. Evolutionary moral
realism holds that there are moral natural kinds that can
ground moral "oughts", and that these kinds are best explained
in evolutionary terms.

In previous work we have argued that evolutionary naturalism
can be objective: John Collier and Michael Stingl, "Evolutionary
Naturalism and the Objectivity of Morality", Biology and
Philosophy 8 (1993): 47-60, reprinted in Paul Thompson,
ed., Issues in Evolutionary Ethics, SUNY Press, Albany,
1995, pp. 409-429. In this talk I will discuss what is at
stake, and how our view differs from other moral naturalisms
that try to reduce or eliminate moral kinds. In particular,
I will discuss why giving an evolutionary explanation of
morality does not need to commit the "is/ought" fallacy.

 22 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54

 Vallas es tudomany: a konfliktuson innen es tul
  Religion and Science: this side of the conflict and beyond

 Mihaly Toth
  Philosophy, Pazmany Peter Catholic University, Budapest

Vallas es tudomany, kulonosen pedig a modern termeszettudomany
viszonyara gondolva leggyakrabban valamilyen szembenallas
kepe sejlik fel elottunk. Ezt az elkepzelest reszben indokoljak
az ujkori tudomanytortenet egyes fejlemenyei. A ket terulet
kapcsolata azonban sokkal arnyaltabb annal, semhogy egy
egyszeru konfliktus- modellel jellemezheto lenne. Az elmult
evtizedekben szamos kiserlet tortent mind teologusok, mind
termeszettudosok, mind a kozvetitesre vallalkozo filozofusok
reszerol, hogy a kerdeses viszony minel tobb aspektusat
feltarjak, valamint hogy a kapcsolat jelen es jovobeni lehetosegeit
felvazoljak.

Eloadasomban a legfontosabb idevonatkozo eszmefuttatasokat
kivanom roviden bemutatni - kiterve a magyar vonatkozasokra
-, altaluk illusztralva a kerdeskor aktualitasat es jelentoseget.
Vitainditokent igyekszem tovabba ramutatni az eddigi kiserletek
nehany problematikus pontjara is.

 29 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54

 Concepts: where the critics of the classical view went
  wrong

 Lilia Gurova
  Department of Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophical
  Research, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia
  Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian
  University, Sofia

In the 1970s, a set of experimental findings convinced cognitive
science community that the view whose main claim is that
concepts are represented by lists of defining features (the
so-called classical view) is to be recognized as inadequate
and replaced by a more sound theory. Some of the critics
of the classical view have even claimed that this view has
failed not only as a psychological theory but also as a
methodological prescription in natural sciences (especially
in biology). Taken seriously, their claim implies that the
search for well-defined concepts in science is generally
misleading. Most scientists, however, would hardly agree
with such a verdict. Is the criticism against the classical
view so unproblematic as it is seen to be today? The aim
of this presentation is to denounce some broadly accepted
myths concerning the so-called classical view and its alleged
main flaws.

___________________
The organizer of the seminar: László E. Szabó


-- 
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo