ELFT HÍRADÓ

[Gömöri Márton <gomorim AT gmail.com>]

Logic and Philosophy of Science Seminar
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University
Budapest, Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224
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P R O G R A M

The seminar is held in hybrid format, in person (Múzeum krt. 4/i Room 224)
and online. Zoom link
<https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84594385686?pwd=a7KPWoNLrPg11xNTi5Ug91YR5mHmmS.1>


24 April (Friday) 4:15 PM  Room 224 + ONLINE

Zsófia Zvolenszky
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös Loránd University,
Title: Varieties of artifactualism and the process of making a fictional
character
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ABSTRACT:

In my talk I’ll outline a proposal about the process of making a fictional
character that I argue provides a superior response to two challenges:

(1)   If created, then “how (and when…) are fictional characters created?”
(much discussed since Stuart Brock formulated the challenge in his “The
creationist fiction: The case against creationism about fictional
characters”, *Philosophical Review*, 2010).

(2)   If one opts for artifactualism about fictional characters, analogous
arguments motivate artifactualism about LeVerrier’s Vulcan as well. (See,
for example, Nathan Salmón’s “Nonexistence”, *Noûs*, 1998; also, Braun,
Caplan). I put this in slogan form: “The artifactualism train runs express
only”.

This will be a – hopefully smooth – train ride, starting with (1),
culminating with a response to (2).

What if you want to get to a certain local train stop and are told that no
local service is running to that destination; meanwhile the express trains
you could board take you way further than you had planned? It’s well to
choose the train ride only if you are in a position to embrace the express
stop available. This is the situation that has recurringly been confronting
philosophers over the past half century with respect to one form of realism
about fictional characters (FCs): *artifactualism*, according to which
*FCs **are non**-**concrete human-**made** objects, that is, non**-**concrete
artifacts*. Various influential arguments suggest that FC-artifactualism is
an unavailable local stop on the artifactualism train which offers express
service only. Once on board that train, it inescapably wizzes one to a
further-away express stop: *artifactualism about the posits of failed
scientific hypotheses* like Babinet’s and LeVerrier’s hypothetical planet
Vulcan. Some philosophers, among them Nathan Salmón, David Braun, Ben
Caplan, have embraced that destination point. Others, among them Stuart
Brock, cautioned to stay off the artifactualism train altogether.

Can we instead find the elusive local train and disembark at a local stop
without taking a stance on artifactualism about the likes of Vulcan? I will
argue that we can and have strong reasons to do so. Though the task is
especially challenging in the light of a phenomenon I had discussed in
prior papers: I envisioned a (contrary to fact) scenario *T* in which
Tolstoy, while writing *War and Peace*, “was under the mistaken impression
that the protagonist, Prince Bolkonsky, like Napoleon (also featured in the
novel), was a real person. Introducing the name ‘Andrei Bolkonksy’, Tolstoy
intended to refer to a historical figure he thought existed quite
independently of his novel” (Zvolenszky 2016, “Fictional characters,
mythical objects, and the phenomenon of inadvertent creation”, *Res
Philosophica*). If one is an artifactualist about FCs then in *T*, due to
Tolstoy’s error, his novel-writing activity launched an FC-making process
whose outcome was a new FC, Andrei Bolkonsky. Crucially, in *T*, Tolstoy’s
process-launching was unintended, inadvertent. I had argued that such
inadvertent authorial launchings are unmysterious and even expected given
Saul Kripke’s general arguments (in his 1970 *Naming and Necessity *lectures)
about name-users’ potential error that can, on occasion, afflict authors as
well.

The *process-launching* aspect of FC-making is a new development on my
prior work. In my talk I will argue that authors as launchers who need not
complete the process, is a plausible stance according to which making FCs
can be *group-projects* on occasion in the context of novels. And even
regularly in the context of other types of works of fiction, for example,
when, in the context of making films, comics, a fictional character is
created (examples prominently discussed in Chris Tillman & Joshua Spencer’s
2023, “Creature features: Character production and failed explanation in
fiction, folklore and theorizing”, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*). Yet
this process and group-project aspect has been ignored and deemphasized in
the literature, which has instead focused on a *solo-act* model of
FC-making, with authors single-handedly making FCs. This solo-act focus
affects even local-train-seeking artifactualists like Kripke (in his
1973 *Reference
and Existence *lectures) and more recently, Tillman&Spencer (2023), but is
especially prominent in Brock’s (2010) arguments against FC-artifactualism.
Along the way, I’ll raise various considerations about philosophical
methodology that allow for artifactualists to shift away from the solo-act
focus and provide better responses than before to various challenges,
including (1) and (2).

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The seminar is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and
faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute
lecture, coffee break, discussion.

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Organizers: Márton Gömöri and Zalán Molnár
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LPS - Logic and Philosophy of Science (Student and Faculty Seminar)
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eötvös University Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/lps