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[Fizinfo] Philosophy of Science Colloquium, April


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  • From: "Laszlo E. Szabo" <leszabo AT hps.elte.hu>
  • To: mafla <mafla AT HPS.ELTE.HU>, fizinfo <fizinfo AT sunserv.kfki.hu>, Multiple recipients of list <koglist AT cogpsyphy.hu>
  • Subject: [Fizinfo] Philosophy of Science Colloquium, April
  • Date: Tue Apr 1 04:15:01 2003
  • List-archive: <http://sunserv.kfki.hu/pipermail/fizinfo/>
  • List-id: ELFT HRAD <fizinfo.lists.kfki.hu>

Department of HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Eotvos University, Budapest
Pazmany P. setany 1/A Budapest
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
Department's Home Page:http://hps.elte.hu

P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e C o l l o q u i u m
Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM
____________________________________
7 April4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54

T i m C r a n e <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/f-staf.htm#crane>
Deprtment of Philosophy
University College London

The problem of perception and its solution

It can seem puzzling why there is a philosophy of perception at all.
Perception is a psychological process or capacity which is studied
empirically by psychology, and some aspects of our perceptual capacities
are now well-understood. What is it, then, that philosophy can
contribute to the understanding of perception? Some philosophers have
argued that the main role of the philosophy of perception is to explain
how perceptions can give us reasons for empirical beliefs. On this
conception of the philosophy of perception, the only problems of
perception are epistemological. In this paper, I argue against this
conception, and argue that (regardless of the
answer to these epistemological questions) there is another problem of
perception, which is the result of a conflict between some fundamental
assumptions contained in our ordinary concept of perception. The worry
here is not that perceptions will not justify belief, but that our
concept of
perception is incoherent. I examine the intentionalist and disjunctivist
solutions to the problem, and present some considerations in favour of
intentionalism.

___________________________________

The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 10-minute break. Then we held a
30-60-minute discussion.The participants may comment the talks and
initiate discussion on the Internet. The comments should be written in
the language of the presentation.

The organizer of the colloquium:
Laszlo E. Szabo (email:
leszabo AT hps.elte.hu)

--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo













  • [Fizinfo] Philosophy of Science Colloquium, April, Laszlo E. Szabo, 04/01/2003

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