ELFT HÍRADÓ

["Laszlo E. Szabo" <leszabo AT ludens.elte.hu>]

Department of HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Eotvos University, Budapest
Pazmany P. setany 1/A Budapest
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
Department's Home Page:http://hps.elte.hu

Philosophy of Science Colloquium
Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM
____________________________________
May Program

 6 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
 (Language: English)

 Models of cognition and social interactions

 Mihail Radu Solcan
  Department of Philosophy, University of Bucharest

(1) The talk is an attempt to emphasize some philosophical
  presuppositions of the application of neural networks
  models in the analysis of social interactions.

(2 )Two main models of cognition are taken into account
  in the talk: the classical model and the neural network
  model.

(3) The use of neural networks models is rather rarely attempted
  in social science. The examples known to the author are
  from economics.

(4) The talk suggests that the use of neural networks models
  in social science is however interesting. The focus is
  on the implications of the application of the last model
  as a model of social interactions.

(5) Two main advantages of such models are suggested: (a)
  they offer an explanation for what is called dispersed
  knowledge; (b) they shift the accent from rational agents
  to interactions and rules in society.

(6) Some criticisms of the use of models in social science
  are examined. We also consider the advantages of alternative
  models with (rational) agents.

(7) Open problems: the meaning of computer simulations of
  social interactions based on neural networks models.


 13 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
 (Language: English, except all participants speak Hungarian)

 Indeterminism and Free Will

 Ferenc Huoranszki
  Central European University, Budapest

The fundamental problem for any libertarian philosophy of
action concerns the intelligibility of free choice in an
indeterministic world. Since free choice implies control
the absence of deterministic processes seems to diminish,
rather than enhance, freedom. Chancy processes decrease
the capacity of control; "indeterminate
decisions" cannot serve as grounds of responsibility-attribution.
Consequently, there could be no freedom in an indeterministic
world. If our world is in fact indeterministic and such
that its indeterminism matters in making choices then we
cannot be free agents.

One possible answer to this problem is to assume that it
is the agent herself, and not some (mental or physical)
event, which causes the action. Robert Kane has recently
proposed an alternative solution. He argues that what is
seen as an indeterministic causal process at the neuro-physiological
level can be considered as an effort of the will at the
mental level. Indeterminate decisions are not arbitrary
in the sense that the agent must have a reason for doing
what she does. But in some of the cases reasons themselves
are not sufficient for choice. It depends on the agent's
choice, which reasons she takes to be weightier. In such
cases the outcome of a decision procedure depends only on
the agent's ultimate choice but 1. the choice is not causally
determined since the "neural basis"
of the mental process is indeterministic and 2. it is not
arbitrary either since in whatever way the agent acts she
has a reason to choose that action. Consequently, probabilistic
causation can explain how control is possible in indeterministic
worlds.

In the talk I'll argue that the idea of probabilistic causation
will not help the incompatibilist. If incompatibilism is
true, freedom of course implies the falsity of determinism.
But probabilistic causation fails to provide the required
link between indeterminism and control. Such control can
only exist if the agent herself and not her neural or mental
states causes her actions.


 27 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
 (Language: English)

 Counterfactuals and the Second Law

 Barry Loewer
  Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University

Counterfactuals e.g. "if the match had
been struck it would have lit",
are temporally asymmetric -- the future typically coutnerfactually
depends on the past but (typically) not the the past on
the future. The second law of thermodynamics is also temporally
asymmetric. It says, roughly, that the entropy of an isolated
system (the universe as a whole) never decreases. So the
idea has occurred to some philosophers and physicists including
Einstein, Reichenbach, Lewis, Sklar, Horwich (among others)
that there is a connection between counterfactuals and thermodynamics
second law, and more generally statistical mechanics. But
none of these spell out what that connection is. Lewis remarks
that he "does not know how to connect the several
asymmetries ...and the famous asymmetry of entropy."
We will fill in part of the story here.

___________________________________

The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 5-minute break. Then
we held a 30-60-minute discussion.The participants may comment the talks and
initiate discussion on the Internet. The comments should be written in the
language of the presentation.

The organizer of the colloquium:
Laszlo E. Szabo (email: 
leszabo AT hps.elte.hu)

-- 
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo