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  • From: "Laszlo E. Szabo" <leszabo AT>
  • To: mafla <mafla AT>, fizinfo <fizinfo AT>, Multiple recipients of list <koglist AT>
  • Subject: [Fizinfo] PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SEMINAR, October
  • Date: Tue Sep 25 23:23:00 2001
  • List-archive: <>
  • List-id: ELFT HRAD <>
  • Organization: Eotvos University

Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A

1* October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
(Language: English)

J o h n B i c k l e

Department of Philosophy and Neuroscience Graduate Program
University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA

Multiple realization, meet molecular neuroscience

In the philosophy of mind, multiple realization refers to the claim that
one and the same logical kind (property, state, event) is realized in
vastly different physical kinds that share nothing of explanatory
relevance in common. Although puzzles about the realization relation
remain, this claim has acquired consensus status as a true and important
premise in an argument against all forms of psychoneural reduction and
type identity. In this paper, I challenge the truth of multiple
realization based on some recent discoveries in cellular and molecular
neuroscience shared across a variety of species and forms of learning
and memory. From sensitization and aversive conditioning in fruit flies
and sea slugs through hippocampal-mediated memories for context in
mammals, the same "second messenger" intracellular biochemical pathway
and molecular genetic process underlies specifically the "consolidation
switch" from short-term to long-term memory. Furthermore, this single
example illustrates a general principle of evolutionary conservatism at
the cellular/molecular level that we can expect to find at work in the
mechanisms for all psychological processes.
Multiple realization, meet molecular neuroscience. The biochemical and
molecular-genetic details that carry the bulk of the argument here will
be unfamiliar to many philosophers and cognitive scientists. But they
reflect the current state of our scientific knowledge. These details
thus serve a useful secondary purpose: they inform
scientifically-inspired philosophers and cognitive scientists about
recent developments in the cellular and molecular core of current
mainstream neuroscience.
* The organizer of the seminar wants to apologize to the lecturer and
the participants for being absent from the talk of 1 October, because of
the ESF Workshop, Bertinoro, Italy.

8 October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
(Language: English, except all participants speak Hungarian)

L a s z l o E. S z a b o

Theoretical Physics Research Group of HAS
Department of History and Philosophy Science
Eötvös University, Budapest

A Physicalist Interpretation of Probability

There is no such property of an event as its "probability." Rather, I
argue that probability is a derivative concept, supervening on physical
quantities characterizing the state of affairs corresponding to the
event in question. The term "probability" can be used only collectively:
it means different dimensionless [0,1]-valued physical quantities
(measures) in the different particular situations. I also argue that
probability is not the limiting value of relative frequency, and not
even necessarily related to the notion of frequency. In some cases, the
conditions of the sequential repetitions of a particular situation are
such, however, that the probability (the corresponding physical
quantity) is approximately equal to the relative frequency of the event
in question. Sometimes we do not know the value of the physical quantity
X, corresponding to the probability of an event A. In this case, if we
are convinced about the relationship between X and the relative
frequency of A, we can measure X by counting the relative frequency of
A. Furthermore, I will argue that probability, as a derivative concept,
has nothing to do with (objective) indeterminism and, on the other hand,
has nothing to do with "lack of knowledge," even if world is

15 October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
(Language: Hungarian)

F e r e n c H u o r a n s z k i
Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest

Tudomány és metafizika (Science and metaphysics)

Abstract: TBA

29** October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
(Language: Hungarian)

S a n d o r S o o s
Department of History and Philosophy Science
Eötvös University, Budapest

Mit jelent a "Mit jelent a faj?" kérdés? (What does the "What do species
mean?" question mean? )

A cimbe agyazott kerdes egy specialis fajtabol valo: egyarant folmerul -
es egyarant vitatott - a biologia es a tudomanyfilozofia teruleten, s
szovevenyesen osszefonodik a metafizika/ontologia osregi problemaival.
Specialis helyzetebol adodoan a valasz szamos iranyban keresheto - mas
elegitene ki a biologust, s megint mas a metaszintu diszciplinak
kepviselojet. Az eloadas fo celkituzese eppen annak feltarasa, hogy hany
ill. hanyfele ertelmet explikalhatjuk a kerdesnek az eddigi
valaszkiserletek, s azon kontextusok alapjan, amelyekben gyakran
elofordul. A "species problem" elnevezesu tematika egy olyan, attekinto
terkepet kivanja megrajzolni, ahol a biologia fajfogalmai, az
arisztotelianus es a Quine-i (valamint a kognitiv pszichologiai)
termeszeti fajtak, a formalis ontologia osztaly- es individuumfogalmai
stb. nyujtanak tampontot a tajekozodashoz.
** The organizer of the seminar wants to apologize to the lecturer and
the participants for being absent from the talk of 29 October, because
of a short visit to Holland.

The organizer of the seminar: László E. Szabó

Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172

  • [Fizinfo] PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SEMINAR, October, Laszlo E. Szabo, 09/25/2001

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