ELFT HÍRADÓ

["Laszlo E. Szabo" <leszabo AT hps.elte.hu>]

Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SEMINAR
(http://hps.elte.hu/seminar)
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18 June 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
(Language: English)

B a r r y   L o e w e r
Philosophy, Rutgers University, New York

David Lewis formulated a principle (he calls it "the Principal
Principle") that he claims tells how chances (and beliefs concerning
chances) should guide belief. The principle is that if the chance at t
of A's occurring is x then your credence at that A will occur should be
x as long as you don't possess any inadmissible information. The
principle is intuitive and explains a lot of statistical practice.
However Lewis thinks it is incompatible with his favorite theory of the
nature of chance and more generally with a metaphysical doctrine called
"Humean Supervenience." I argue that Lewis is mistaken about this.
Further more I show  that while there can be no "justification" of the
principle that shows that following it will lead to successful results
one can provide a kind of "rationale" for the principle based on Lewis'
account of the nature of chance.

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End of the 2000/2001 program
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I would like to thank you all, the lecturers and the audience,
your participation and the stimulating atmosphere of the seminars!
See you in September!

 László E. Szabó
The organizer of the seminar

--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo